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1 Introduction1 
While providing income support to those in need is an important feature of the welfare system a 
balance needs to be struck in order to maintain financial incentives to work. The state provides cash 
transfers such as state pensions and jobseekers payments to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens but 
also provides support for individuals through the provision of non-cash supports. Standard analysis of 
financial incentives to work tends to ignore non-cash transfers and focusses instead on cash supports 
provided by the state. This means that supports provided to individuals that do not result in a direct 
cash transfer to them will not be captured in standard analyses looking at the distributional or work 
incentive impact of government transfers.  Such non-cash benefits, however, are likely to improve the 
welfare of recipients by providing for the needs of an individual without requiring payment for such 
goods or services. 
In this report we measure the financial incentive to work for individuals and families in Ireland and 
how it is affected by two such non-cash supports - the health card system, consisting of Medical and 
GP-visit Cards and the Affordable Childcare Scheme (ACS) subsidies. We focus both on the financial 
incentive to be in paid employment, measured by replacement rates (RR) and participation tax rates 
(PTR) and the financial incentive to progress, measured by effective marginal tax rates (EMTR). 
Section 2 discusses the measurement of financial incentives to work. Section 3 looks at issues in 
placing a value on non-cash benefits and describes how we have done this for the health cards and 
ACS subsidies. Section 4 examines how the inclusion of these two non-cash benefits affects financial 
incentives to work and Section 5 concludes.  
2 Measuring Financial Incentives to Work 
In general, an examination of financial incentives to work focusses on two margins – the financial 
incentive to be in paid work in the first place and the financial incentive to progress, i.e. to earn more 
either by working more hours or receiving a pay rise/promotion.  
                                                          
1 This work was undertaken as part of the Tax, Welfare and Pensions programme at the ESRI funded by the 
Departments of Employment Affairs and Social Protection; Health; Children and Youth Affairs; and Finance.  
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2.1 The Financial Incentive to be in Paid Work 
There are two commonly used ways to measure the incentive to be in paid work. The first is to 
calculate the replacement rate (RR), which shows an individual’s out-of-work income as a percentage 
of their in-work income.  
𝑅𝑅 =
net income out of work
net income in work
 
For example, an individual whose net income out-of-work was €200, and whose net income in work 
was €400 would have a replacement rate of 50 per cent.  
The second commonly used measure to capture financial incentives to be in paid work is the 
participation tax rate (PTR). The PTR shows the proportion of earnings that are not taken away via 
taxes (including social insurance) or lower benefit entitlements when an individual enters 
employment. 
𝑃𝑇𝑅 = 1 −
disposable income in work − disposable income out of work
gross earnings
 
The PTR has an advantage over the RR measure in that it is driven largely by how the tax and benefit 
system affects the incentive to work, as opposed to potential earnings. While the RR combines the 
incentives caused by taxes and earnings power, the PTR distinguishes, to a greater extent, between 
whether a reduced reward to work is caused by higher taxes or lower wages. 
The RR measure can therefore be viewed as the absolute strength of financial incentives to work 
whereas the PTR measure tells us the effect of the tax and benefit system on financial work incentives. 
Both are of interest, and because of this we will present both in this report. For both these measures 
a lower value means a higher financial incentive to work.  
Using a tax-benefit microsimulation model RRs and PTRs can be calculated for those currently in and 
out of work. For both these measures we need to know how much an employed person would receive 
in benefits if they were unemployed. To do these we use SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model to 
estimate how much an individual would receive in Jobseekers Assistance payments were they to be 
unemployed and calculate disposable income based on this.2 Likewise, for those currently 
unemployed we estimate their hourly wage and their likely work hours (see Box 2.1 for more 
information on this). We then use SWITCH to calculate the individual’s disposable income based on 
                                                          
2 These can be viewed as longer-term work incentives once any entitlement to Jobseekers Benefit has been 
exhausted. 
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these estimated weekly earnings.  For both groups, workers3 and non-workers4, who are part of a 
couple we calculate their counterfactual disposable income (i.e. their disposable income should their 
employment status change) holding the employment status of their partner constant.5 Given our 
interest in the impact of childcare costs and subsidies on financial work incentives we must also 
estimate childcare costs for those out of work should they be in employment. This estimation is also 
described in Box 2.1. 
Box 2.1 Deciding on Wages, Hours of Work and Childcare Costs for Non-Workers 
In order to calculate RRs and PTRs for non-workers, including childcare costs and subsidies, we must 
first calculate for non-workers estimated hourly wages, anticipated work hours and anticipated 
childcare costs upon entering employment. 
Hourly Wage Estimates 
While it is straightforward to calculate how much an employed person would receive in benefits if 
they became unemployed as jobseekers payments are flat-rate, it is more difficult to estimate how 
much those out of work would earn in employment as their anticipated wage will depend on their 
characteristics, for example, their education level.  To estimate the hourly wage an individual can 
command, we run an OLS regression model based on characteristics such as age and educational 
qualifications and adjust for likely wage scarring those out of employment tend to experience. More 
detail on the approach can be found in Savage et al. (2014). We exclude retirees and those who are 
ill/disabled but not seeking employment from our analysis given that estimating wages for these 
groups may be difficult and assuming that they are available for employment may be unrealistic.   
Work Hour Assumptions 
While we could simply assume an individual will work a full 39 or 40-hour week this may produce 
misleading results. Certain characteristics of individuals may make them substantially less likely to 
work full-time, for example, females with a child/children of preschool age are more likely to work 
part-time relative to others, for example, males. We, therefore, place the employed in our data into 
four work hour bands (0-15; 16-24; 25-35; 35+) and using this information run a multinomial probit 
model on the employed to estimate the probability of each unemployed person in our sample 
working each of these four bands. 6 We then compute the RR and PTR for each of these individuals at 
the midpoint of these hour bands and calculate a single weighted RR/PTR using the estimated work 
hour band probabilities as weights. This will mean, for example that if an individual has a 70% 
estimated probability of working full-time (i.e. 35 hours plus) then the most weight is given to the 
                                                          
3 Both the employed and self-employed. 
4 We include those who are unemployed (i.e. out of but seeking work) along with those reporting home duties.  
5 We also hold the work status of parents constant when calculating Medical/GP-Visit Card entitlement for adult 
children living at home who are classified as dependent.  
6 We follow here the method used in Adams and Browne (2010).  
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RR/PTR calculated for this person at full-time work hours. This method helps ensure that we are 
estimating ‘realistic’ and representative RRs and PTRs for individuals.  
Childcare Usage and Costs 
Given that this report focusses on examining the impact of childcare costs on work incentives, we 
have to make some assumptions regarding childcare usage for those currently out of work should 
they enter employment. The hours of care assumed for non-workers is based on the assumed work 
hours (discussed above) and partner work hours if the individual is part of a couple – for example, for 
a lone parent childcare hours are set as equal to work hours. For a couple no childcare is assumed if 
one member of the couple is not in work or education. If both are in employment then childcare 
hours are assumed to equal the work hours of the partner with the lowest hours. Assumed childcare 
hours are adjusted downwards by school hours if the children are of school going age. We assume 
that childcare used for those moving into employment will be formal. This assumption will tend to 
overestimate the favourable impact of the ACS scheme on work incentives as ACS is only payable 
towards formal care and not all parents will opt for that. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
those not in employment are less likely to have free (e.g. grandparent) childcare available to them as 
those with this option are likely to avail of it where possible. Secondly, some parents may opt for 
informal care such as paid childminders. However, the hourly cost of such care is not substantially 
below that of formal care (for example €4.50/€5.70 per hour of informal care compared to 
€4.70/€5.90 per hour for formal care for pre-school/primary school children as shown in QNHS 2016). 
Therefore, we are not significantly overestimating the total cost of childcare for those that may opt 
for childminders. In addition, given that the ACS subsidies are currently only payable for those Tusla 
registered (and with less than 1% of childminders registered), it is likely that ACS will have an impact 
on the choice between formal (and therefore potentially subsidised) and informal (and therefore not 
subsidised) care - so that those eligible for ACS would be expected to be more likely to opt for formal 
care.  
Now that we have anticipated childcare hours we use hourly childcare costs for pre-school and 
primary school children taken from the QNHS 2016 Special Module on childcare costs and adjust to 
current price levels7 to arrive at total, weekly childcare costs. We then use the estimates of childcare 
hours used to calculate the ACS subsidy8 that would be payable. 
 
                                                          
7 Using changes in the childcare sub-index of the CPI up to October 2018 and the ESRI’s latest forecast for overall 
CPI growth in 2019. 
8 We do not take account of the ECCE scheme in our analysis given that eligibility is based purely on child age 
and the scheme is not means tested. Entitlement to the scheme will, therefore, be available both in and out of 
work and should not play a role in financial work incentives. 
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2.2 The Financial Incentive to Progress 
In order to measure the financial incentive to progress we use the Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
(EMTR). The EMTR measures what part of any additional earnings are “taxed away” through the 
combined effect of increasing taxes and decreasing benefits. 
𝐸𝑀𝑇𝑅 = 100 ∗ (1 −
Change in disposable Income
Increase in gross earnings
 ) 
For example, if an individual gets a €50 increase in their gross weekly pay (either by working more 
hours or by getting a pay rise) but loses €25 of this through increased tax, USC, PRSI or withdrawal of 
benefits (for example through withdrawal of the Working Family Payment) then this individual has a 
EMTR of 50%. 
EMTRs are calculated for each individual using SWITCH. This is done by awarding each worker9 a small 
additional amount of income (e.g. an additional percentage of current earnings) and using the model 
to calculate the individual’s new disposable income once additional income tax, USC, PRSI or benefit 
withdrawal has been taken into account.  
2.3 Income Definitions and Time Horizons 
Financial incentives to work tend to focus on disposable income (i.e. post-transfer, post-tax/USC/PRSI 
income) and do not usually take account of non-cash transfers or costs of work. While costs of work 
are widely recognised as having an impact on labour supply decisions, such costs are usually not 
incorporated into the standard measures of financial work incentives.  Some work has been done in 
this area in Ireland, for example, Callan et al. (2012) examined the impact of childcare and travel to 
work costs on financial work incentives. Comparing Ireland internationally shows that Ireland has 
some of the highest childcare costs as a proportion of income across the OECD (see OECD 2016) and 
recent work by Russell et al. (2018) found that higher childcare costs were associated with lower 
maternal labour supply. The inclusion of such costs in examining financial incentives to work, 
therefore, seems highly important. Developments of childcare subsidies in recent years – such as the 
ECCE and ACS schemes – aim to offset some of these costs and help increase the incentive to be in 
employment.  Regan and Keane (2018) also examined the impact the inclusion of childcare costs and 
these childcare subsidies had on the financial work incentives of lone parents. Taking childcare costs 
into account caused a sharp rise in the proportion of lone parents who were financially better off not 
being in employment (2.5% up to 15.7%). This was reduced once childcare subsidies were taken into 
                                                          
9 Employees and self-employed. 
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account with a particularly notable fall in the proportion of lone parents with very high (120% plus) 
replacement rates from 11.4% to 6.5%.  
Other entitlements to non-cash benefits, such as the medical card, and their potential loss, may also 
be an important consideration for individuals considering returning to employment or working more. 
The medical card has been shown to act as a disincentive to employment (see Russell and Corcoran 
(2001), for the case of lone parents) but again such considerations will not be taken into account in 
standard financial incentives to work given the focus on cash incomes.  
It is worth noting that financial incentives to work may differ over the short and long term. Firstly, 
short-term incentives to not work may be larger for those eligible for Jobseekers Benefit (JSB) given 
its non means-tested nature while longer-term incentives to not work may be weaker if an individual 
has a partner with income that may reduce or eliminate their entitlement to the means-tested 
Jobseekers Assistance (JSA) payment.10 Other considerations may also come into play – Callan et al. 
(2012) found that of those financially better off not working (i.e. with RRs in excess of 100 per cent), 
once work costs such as travel and childcare were taken into account, nearly three-quarters were 
actually in employment. Individuals may derive personal satisfaction from being in employment, or 
may want to remain in the workforce to protect their future earnings, which could be damaged by a 
spell of unemployment. This may particularly be the case for those with children – there may be a 
time period during which childcare costs may be high (for example, while their children are of 
preschool age) and financial incentives to work low, but a parent may choose to stay in employment 
over these years to protect their career and future earnings.  
Supporting this idea, Brewer et al. (2018) use a structural, dynamic model of education and labour 
supply to derive two new, and longer term, measures of the financial incentive to be in paid work – 
the forward-looking replacement rate (FLRR) and the forward-looking participation tax rate (FLPTR). 
They found that the dynamic gain from returning to work was substantially higher than the standard 
static measures, driven by returns to experience. 11 
                                                          
10 Given that longer-term considerations are more likely to influence an individual’s decision to take up 
employment we therefore estimate the amount an individual would receive in JSA rather than JSB. This can be 
seen as the longer term financial incentive to work.  
11 Given that we focus on longer-term financial incentives to be in paid work we do not factor in that some 
individuals (e.g. those unemployed for more than 12 months) may retain their medical card for three years after 
returning to employment. 
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3 Valuing Non Cash Benefits 
As discussed, focussing purely on cash incomes and transfers and failing to take account of non-cash 
benefits will tend to underestimate the economic welfare of the population. Issues arise, however, in 
deciding how exactly a value should be placed on such non-cash benefits and it is for this reason that 
their inclusion in the calculation of financial incentives to work is usually omitted. Should the value of 
such benefits be the cost of provision? Smeeding et al. (1993) points out that an individual may be in 
receipt of a non-cash benefit but would rather spend the cost of the benefit on an alternative item if 
they were to receive it in cash. In this case valuing the benefit on a cost basis will overestimate the 
welfare of its recipient. On the other hand, governments, as a ‘bulk buyer’ of goods and services, may 
be able to provide the good or service at a discounted rate. If so, valuing the benefit on a cost to the 
state basis may undervalue it. One alternative would be to value the non-cash benefit at the cost an 
individual, without such a discounted rate, would face in the market. While this may be possible for 
some goods and services, for others no private market may exist.  
In this section we discuss the issues surrounding valuation of non-cash benefits with a focus on the 
two cash benefits of interest in this report – Medical/GP-Visit Cards and ACS subsidies. 
3.1 Valuation of Medical and GP-Visit Cards 
Researchers have attempted to place values on health benefits in a variety of ways. The first method 
commonly used is the cost per capita approach which assumes the value of the benefit to the 
beneficiary is equal to the cost of providing it. To arrive at this valuation we would simply divide the 
total cost of the Medical/GP-Visit card system by the total number of beneficiaries. A more nuanced 
approach than average cost per capita is the risk-related approach. This is similar to the cost-per-
capita approach but it uses expenditure based on an individual’s gender and age group, rather than 
total expenditure for all, irrespective of what use was actually made of public health services. A third 
valuation approach exists, known as the market value approach, in which the valuation is based on 
what the individual would have to pay if they were to consume the same bundle of goods and services, 
i.e. the equivalent health insurance premium that would have to be paid to receive the same benefits. 
The market value approach can be difficult to calculate, particularly when benefits differ between 
medical card and private insurer schemes. The medical card provides different benefits to a family (for 
example, many health insurance policies do not cover the (full) cost of GP visits, consultant visits, 
medication etc.) while private health insurance may cover access to private hospitals not covered by 
the medical card. In addition, the medical card acts as a ‘passport’ to other services such as free school 
transport etc. While a wide array of insurance options exist it is difficult to think of a policy in the 
private health insurance market that would accurately mirror the benefits of the medical card. The 
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usage approach attributes a value to health services based on usage (e.g. number of doctors’ visits, 
number of nights spent in hospital etc.). Finally, the recipient or cash equivalent approach asks those 
in receipt of a non cash benefit what amount of cash that would make them feel just as well off. This 
approach can be burdensome in that it would require conducting a survey of cardholders for such a 
purpose. In addition, it can also be difficult for holders to place a monetary value on the cards as its 
perceived value can be difficult to put a price on. For example, Russell and Corcoran (2001) in a study 
of those in receipt of the One Parent Family Payment found that the value placed on a medical card 
went beyond that of the services provided to cardholders as the card provided security and peace of 
mind to cardholders.  
No one approach is the ‘best’ one to use, rather each approach has its merits and must be considered 
in context. If our aim is to examine where the government spends its resources, then the cost per 
capita approach is a sensible one to use as it allows us to examine where across the income 
distribution or different family types government expenditure on health benefits goes. A valid criticism 
of the usage approach exists in that it makes those in poor health appear better off simply due to their 
higher consumption of, and need for, healthcare. This method, however, along with the cash 
equivalent approach, is perhaps an appropriate method to use in the analysis of work incentives. For 
example, if an unemployed individual holding a medical card moves into employment and loses their 
medical card, those in poor health who make extensive use of health services, and now face large out-
of-pocket health payments, are likely to face significantly larger work disincentives than those with 
lower health needs. Including a value of a medical card in work incentive analysis on a cost-per-capita 
basis would fail to capture this issue.  
We therefore feel the most appropriate and practical valuation method to use in analysing work 
incentives is the usage approach.12 In deciding to work, or work more, people are likely to be cognisant, 
not how much the government pays for their card, but rather what costs they might face in its absence. 
For example, 2 individuals of the same gender and age will cost the same in capitation fees paid to a 
GP but if one is in poor health and attends the GP much more frequently than the other the loss of 
the card is likely to have more serious financial implications for the individual in poor health.  
It is important to bear in mind that even the usage approach is likely to be an underestimate of the 
true ‘value’ of a medical card. Given data limitations, (see Appendix One) this valuation approach 
covers only GP, medicine and hospital usage. Those entitled to a medical card experience an array of 
other benefits. These include health related benefits such as dental treatments, medical aids and 
                                                          
12 For more information on how we assign a usage valuation in SWITCH see Appendix One. 
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appliances and non-health related benefits such as reduced USC rates, free school transport to school, 
fee waivers for state exams etc. In addition, the presence of the card may simply give peace of mind 
or ‘insurance’ and it is extremely difficult to place a value on this.  
 
3.2 Valuation of ACS Subsidies 
Valuation of the ACS subsidies is more straightforward given that the government makes a cash 
transfer for those eligible directly to the childcare provider, thus reducing their childcare costs by this 
amount. We assume, therefore, that the value of the subsidy is simply the amount of this cash 
transfer.  
4 Results13 
We now present the results of our analysis of work incentives beginning with the ‘standard’ cash work 
incentives, moving on to include childcare costs before adding in firstly ACS subsidies and finally 
Medical and GP-Visit Card valuations. We begin by examining the incentive to be in paid work as 
measured by RRs and PTRs before examining the impact of ACS subsidises and Medical/GP-Visit Card 
entitlements on the incentive to progress, the EMTR.  
4.1 Incentive to Be In Paid Work  
For RRs and PTRs we present four distributions for the four income concepts: 
• The benchmark based on the standard cash incomes (labelled ‘Benchmark’ in the graphs 
below). 
• The benchmark deducting childcare costs from income (labelled ‘Plus full childcare costs’ 
below). 
• The benchmark, deducting childcare costs and adding in ACS subsidies to income (labelled 
‘Plus net childcare costs’ below). 
• The benchmark, deducting childcare costs and adding in ACS subsidies and Medical/GP-Visit 
Cards to income (labelled ‘Plus net childcare costs and cards’ below). 
                                                          
13 The SWITCH model is underpinned with data from 2013/14/15 SILC adjusted to 2019 levels. Results are based 
on analysis of strictly controlled Research Microdata Files provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The 
CSO does not take any responsibility for the views expressed or the outputs generated from this research. We 
thank the CSO for access to this data. 
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Figures 1 and 2 show the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for each of the four distributions. 
By tracing upwards from the horizontal axis these CDFs show the proportion of individuals with a 
RR/PTR below this rate. In general, a movement of the CDF to the right indicates a worsening in the 
incentive to work while a shift to the left indicates an improvement. 
Given that we are interested in the impact of childcare costs and subsidies on work incentives, we 
focus only on those with children,14 splitting that group into lone parents and couples. 
Overall, in Figure 1, we see that the financial incentive to work worsens for lone parents once childcare 
costs are taken into account (i.e. the CDF shifts to the right). Taking account of childcare subsidies 
improves the financial incentive to work (CDF shifts to the left) but they worsen again once the value 
of Medical and GP-visit cards is taken account of (i.e. the CDF shifts again to the right). A relatively 
large shift is seen at the 60% mark – under the benchmark scenario 40% of lone parents have a RR of 
60% or more. This rises to 48% once childcare costs are taken into account but improves back to 42% 
as the ACS subsidies are taken into account. The inclusion of Medical and GP-Visit card values pushes 
this figure to 52%, i.e. the financial incentive to work weakens. Focussing on the 70% RR level, under 
the benchmark scenario 20% of lone parents have a relatively high RR of 70% or more. As expected, 
this rises to 27% once childcare costs are taken into account as these costs worsen the financial 
incentive to work. The inclusion of ACS subsidies strengthens the financial incentive to work for lone 
parents with a drop in the numbers with high RRs (70%+) to 22%. Finally, the inclusion of Medical and 
GP-Visit card values pushes this figure to 29% as anticipated.  
                                                          
14 RRs and PTRs are shown in Appendix Two for the entire population (excluding retirees and those out of work 
due to illness or disability), including those without children.  
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Figure 1: Replacement Rate Distribution; Lone Parents 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
Looking at the distribution of lone parent PTRs we see a similar pattern with work incentives 
worsening once childcare costs and Medical/GP-Visit card values are taken into account. 8% of lone 
parents have a PTR of 70% or more, rising to 13% upon inclusion of childcare costs. Again, financial 
incentives are strengthened once ACS subsidies are factored in as the numbers having PTRs in excess 
of 70% falls to 12%. The inclusion of Medical and GP-Visit card values once again weakens the 
incentives to work with 13% of lone parents having a PTR of 70% or more once the cards are taken 
into account. Given that RRs are driven both by the tax-benefit system and earnings while PTRs help 
isolate the impact of the tax-benefit system alone, this difference in results for lone parents indicates 
that a weaker earnings potential for this group has a role to play in their financial incentive to work. 
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Figure 2: Participation Tax Rate Distribution; Lone Parents 
 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
 
Looking at couples with children, we see the proportion with high RRs is more extreme. Under the 
baseline 60% have a RR above the 60% mark, rising to 68% once net childcare costs and medical/GP-
Visit cards are taken into account. Meanwhile 37% of couples with children have a RR of 70% or more, 
rising to 43% once childcare costs are included. This falls back to 42% one ACS subsidies are 
considered. The lesser impact of ACS for couples is likely due to two factors – there will be less 
childcare hours used within couples due to the fact that both are available to provide childcare, as 
opposed to the case of lone parents who will usually be in the sole childcare provision role. In addition, 
couples are also less likely to benefit from ACS as they potentially have two incomes, which may push 
them above the income threshold for the subsidies. The addition of Medical and GP-Visit card values 
results in 47% of couples with children having a RR of 70% or more. 
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Figure 3: Replacement Rate Distribution; Couples with Children 
 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
 
Looking at PTRs we again see the same pattern as for lone parents – the proportion of couples with 
children with high PTRs rises once childcare costs are considered. The inclusion of ACS improves the 
financial work incentives slightly but they worsen again once Medical and GP-Visit cards are taken 
account of.  
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Figure 4: Participation Tax Rate Distribution; Couples with Children 
 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
 
We repeat the analysis for couples with children breaking down the results to show RRs/PTRs for the 
primary and secondary earners15 within these couples (see Appendix Three for the relevant graphs). 
Not surprisingly, primary earners have lower RRs (i.e. higher financial incentives to be in employment) 
and they are mostly affected by the inclusion of Medical/GP-Visit card values. Secondary earners have 
higher RRs and for them cards don’t have much effect; however, childcare costs are more salient. 
Contrary to primary earners, many secondary earners would not be in work and are, therefore, less 
likely to be paying for childcare. When calculating their disposable income in the counterfactual (i.e. 
making them employed) they then incur childcare costs - reducing their in-work disposable income 
and raising their RRs as a result. The same pattern can be seen with PTRs whereby the financial 
incentive to work is higher for primary earners. 
Finally, the estimated choice of work hours also plays a role in the differing results between lone 
parents and couples with children. Over half of lone parents are predicted to work less than full-time 
hours (i.e. <35 hours per week) compared to two-fifths of those in a couple with children. This will 
                                                          
15 Each member of a couple may not be in employment. If not in employment they are assigned 
primary/secondary earner status based on their predicted wage with the ‘primary earner’ being the member of 
the couple with a higher predicted wage and the ‘secondary earner’ being the member of the couple with the 
lower predicted wage.  
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mean that lone parents will be more likely to benefit from larger amounts of in-work benefits, such as 
the Working Family Payment (WFP), as their lower earnings will increase the amount of WFP they 
receive relative to couples. A higher likelihood of receiving this payment, along with a higher amount 
received (both driven by the lower work hours and therefore earnings of lone parents) will result in 
lower RRs/PTRs, and higher incentives to work, as this payment will serve to boost in-work income for 
lone parents more so.  
 
4.2 Effective Marginal Tax rates 
Finally, while the existence of targeted benefits such as the ACS subsidies may increase the financial 
incentive to be in employment, as has been shown in the previous section, withdrawing a benefit as 
income rises may create disincentives to earn more – be that though working more hours, or seeking 
a rise in hourly pay. In this section we consider how the ACS and health card system influence the 
EMTRs faced by workers, both employees and the self-employed. EMTRs shown here are calculated 
on the assumption that workers16 earn 3% extra, the wage growth forecasted for 2019 by McQuinn et 
al. (2018). As we are assuming this 3% rise in earned income comes from a rise in pay/profit rather 
than an increase in work hours no change in childcare hours and costs are assumed. Given the fact 
that no additional childcare costs are incurred we therefore examine EMTRs under three scenarios: 
• The benchmark based on the standard cash incomes (labelled ‘Benchmark’ in the graph 
below). 
• The benchmark, taking into account ACS subsidies (labelled ‘Plus ACS subsidies’ below). 
• The benchmark, taking into account ACS subsidies and Medical/GP-Visit Cards (labelled ‘Plus 
ACS subsidies and cards’ below). 
Given the focus on childcare subsidies we again restrict our analysis here to workers with children.17 
Figure 5 shows the proportion of tax units (with children) in each EMTR category ranging from those 
with low EMTRs on the left hand side to those with high EMTRs on the right. The black bars show the 
standard benchmark EMTRs based on disposable income taking into account only taxes and cash 
benefits. The white dotted bar shows how EMTRs are affected when we include the ACS subsidies 
while the grey bar presents the distribution of EMTRs including both ACS subsidies and the value of a 
Medical or GP-visit Card. Upon inclusion of the ACS subsidies the proportion of workers with children 
                                                          
16 Both employees and the self-employed are included. 
17 Results for the total employed population (i.e. those with/without children) are shown in Appendix Two. 
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who have an EMTR of 20-30% falls from 29% to 25.6% with a corresponding jump in the 30-40% range 
(increasing from 1.5% to 4.5%). A less pronounced drop occurs in the 40-50% group (falling from 30.5% 
to 29.7%) accompanied by a corresponding rise in the proportion in the 50-60% group (up from 19.3% 
to 20.5%).  
The inclusion of Medical and GP-Visit Card valuations has a more muted effect on the distribution of 
EMTRs. This will be driven by the fact that EMTRs are only relevant for those in employment while 
Medical Cards, in particular, will be less prevalent amongst those in employment due to their means 
tested nature.18 The main change in EMTRs upon inclusion of medical and GP-Visit Card values is a 
small rise in the proportion with an EMTR of 70% or more, which increases by 1 percentage point 
(from 6.8% to 7.8%) compared to the baseline scenario excluding these two non-cash benefits. This is 
likely a reflection of the ‘all or nothing’ nature of these cards. ACS subsidies are withdrawn gradually 
with income and this tapering is reflected in the fact that the rise in EMTRs, discussed above, upon 
the inclusion of ACS subsidies was restricted to the neighbouring EMTR level (i.e. for example the drop 
in the 20-30% EMTR group was accompanied by a rise in the 30-40% group as opposed to a larger 
rise). Some of those holding a Medical or GP-Visit card will find that a small increase in earnings will 
send them over the income limit for the card and result in a loss of eligibility entirely (and therefore a 
loss of the full value of the card) creating a sharper rise in a person’s EMTR.19  
 
                                                          
18 For example in SILC 2015 of those heads of households who report holding a Medical Card 23% are in work 
(employment/self-employment). Of those who report holding a GP-Visit Card 41% are in work. This compares 
to 70% for heads of households who do not report holding a Medical or GP-Visit Card. 
19 Those losing a Medical Card due to a 3% rise in earnings are likely to remain eligible for a GP-Visit Card as the 
income limits for GP-Visit Cards are 50% higher than those for Medical Cards. Therefore those who go above the 
Medical Card income limit, but remain below the GP-Visit Card limit will lose the value of a Medical Card but 
gain the value of a GP-Visit Card. Given that the GP-Visit Card only covers the cost of GP-visits it will be of a lower 
value than a Medical card if the person incurs prescription medication or hospital costs.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTRs) – Workers with Children 
 
Source: SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
 
5 Conclusions 
This report has examined the financial work incentives faced by those with children in Ireland. 
Standard work incentive measures fail to consider childcare costs and also focus on cash incomes, 
ignoring non-cash transfers the state provides. We discussed the issues that arise in placing values on 
non-cash benefits, which helps illustrate why standard work incentive measures often omit them, 
particularly healthcare benefits. We have, however, arrived at a method to value such healthcare 
benefits and adjusted the standard work incentive measures to take account of childcare costs, ACS 
subsidies and Medical and GP-Visit Cards.  
As anticipated, the inclusion of childcare costs led to a worsening of the incentive to be in 
employment, with a rise in the numbers of lone parents and couples with children experiencing high 
RRs and PTRs. Taking account of the recently introduced ACS subsidies work incentives improve, 
particularly for those with a lower financial incentive to work. The financial incentive to work as 
measured by the RR was less favourable than the PTR measure indicating that both the tax-benefit 
system and earnings potential of those not in employment have a role to play. As anticipated, the 
inclusion of values for Medical and GP-Visit Cards worsened the incentive to be in paid employment.  
The EMTR results illustrate the fact that policies put in place to encourage labour supply responses, 
such as the ACS subsidies, will worsen the incentive to earn more due to their means-tested nature. 
We examined the impact on EMTRs of experiencing the average 3% wage growth forecast for 2019. 
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Overall, taking into account the ACS subsidies we see a small rise in EMTRs, tempered by the fact that 
the subsidies are withdrawn gradually. Medical and GP-Visit cards had a lesser impact on EMTRs 
overall but did result in a small proportion of workers experiencing a sharp rise in their EMTR as they 
lose entitlement to a Medical or GP-Visit Card, reflecting the ‘all or nothing’ nature of the cards 
compared to childcare subsidies. 
These results point to the important role childcare costs and non-cash benefits play in determining 
people’s work incentives and illustrate the need to go beyond cash incomes when assessing incentives 
to work or earn more. The EMTR results point to the need to monitor the impact of wage growth on 
benefit entitlements as average increases in wages will reduce or remove an individual’s eligibility for 
ACS subsidies and Medical/GP-Visit Cards if income thresholds are not adjusted each year in line with 
wage growth, an issue discussed further in Callan et al. (2019).   
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Appendix One: Usage Approach Valuation in SWITCH20 
The usage approach method for valuation of medical and GP-Visit cards exploits individual level 
microdata from SILC to provide more variation in the usage of healthcare services than was previously 
possible. As noted, the usage approach can have the effect of making sicker people appear relatively 
better off once the value of the health benefit has been allocated but it has a role to play in work 
incentive analysis. We place a value on the cards based on visits to the GP, prescription medication 
consumption and usage of hospital services. An advantage of this method is the ability to distinguish 
between cost and value. 
Data in SILC provides us with three sources of information: 
1. Hospital nights for every individual 
2. The number of free GP visits in the past four weeks for medical and GP visit card holders 
3. The number of free prescriptions availed of for medical card holders 
For points 2 and 3 there is a data truncation issue as the GP and prescription medicine usage of those 
not holding cards is not observed. To overcome this issue we predict the usage of GP services and 
prescription medicine for all those individuals who do not hold a medical card (or a GP visit card as 
related to GP usage) in SILC. We do so using an Ordinary Least Squares regression of each outcome, 
the annual number of GP visits and the number of free prescriptions (excluding the €2.50 charge fee) 
with separate regressions for adults and children. The set of predictors used to predict GP and 
prescription drug usage for adults and children is displayed below in Table 1. In SILC, there is a separate 
set of questions asked of those under 16 and those aged 16 or older. As a result some very useful 
questions such as self-reported health status, which is available for adults, is not available for children. 
As a result the specification of the regression equations varied for adults and children in order to use 
the best available data. The predictive variables used in each regression are displayed below in Table 
1. The fit statistics were quite robust with the equations for adults producing an R-squared of 43 per 
cent for prescription medicine and 39 per cent for GP usage.21 The R-squared for the child level 
regression was noticeably lower, meaning the regression had less predictive power, primarily due to 
the lack of health related variables for children. For children, the models yielded R-squared statistics 
of 19 per cent for prescriptions and 24 per cent for GP usage.  
                                                          
20 Much of the description here is adapted from a report on the issue of card valuations sent to the Department 
of Health but is yet unpublished.  
21 That is 43 (39) per cent in the variation of prescription medicine (GP) usage for adults can be explained by the   
regression model. 
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Table 1: Variables used to predict GP and prescription medicine usage 
Adults Children (Under 15s) 
Age Age 
Age squared, Age cubed Age Squared 
Physical health condition Private health insurance 
Mental health condition Month of interview 
Emotional health condition Family type 
Number of nights spent in public hospitals Healthboard region 
Chronic Illness Family type 
Private health insurance Family earned income 
Earned Income Educational attainment of adults in the 
family 
Gender Health status of adults in the family 
Healthboard region Gender 
Educational attainment Age x Gender 
Labour force status Age x Healthboard 
Health status 
 
Month of interview 
 
Family Type 
 
Health status x Gender 
 
Health status x Age 
 
Health status x Age Squared 
 
Gender  x Age 
 
Gender x Age Squared 
 
Gender x Age Cubed 
 
 
For adults we include controls for age and earned income. We estimate health effects by utilising self-
reported health status of survey respondents ranging from “Very Good”, “Good”, “Fair”, Poor” to 
“Very Poor”. Health status was also interacted with age and gender to determine if there was a non-
linearity in the effect of health status on healthcare usage. For example, it could be the case that 
women who report poor health may avail of GP services more often than men who report the same 
health status. Additional health related variables were included, namely indicator variables to 
highlight if an individual suffered from a mental, physical, emotional and/or chronic condition.  As we 
had data on the number of public hospital nights for all individuals in the sample, it seemed prudent 
to include this known information on use of primary care as a predictor of GP and prescription 
medicine use. The role of private health insurance could also be an important factor in understanding 
the use of GPs and prescription medicines. Individuals reporting a Medical Card and private health 
insurance could be those who value their health the most or to whom having access to healthcare is 
most important. We therefore include a dummy variable to indicate whether an individual is covered 
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under private health insurance to capture the effect of private health insurance on primary care use 
amongst card holders. 
We control for demographic traits such as gender, family type, educational attainment, labour force 
status and the health board region the family is living in. As the data on GP and prescription medicine 
is on a 4-week basis, this estimate is then grossed up to reach the annual amount. To account for 
seasonality which may occur in the data, e.g. those sampled in December may report attending a GP 
more often than those sampled in the summer months, indicators for the month of interview are 
included.  
As mentioned, for children, a more limited set of predictive information was available. As in the adult 
specification we include age, age squared, gender, interview month, family type and whether the child 
is covered under a private health insurance scheme. To control for the effects which parents would 
have on influencing their child’s use of childcare, we include the health status of other adults in the 
family, the earned income of other adult family members and the educational attainment of other 
adult family members. The age of the child is also interacted with their regional effect and gender to 
assess whether they are any higher order effects with age and these factors.  
This work then provides us with information on hospital usage, GP attendance and the number of 
prescription medicines used (for the latter two these are based on actual GP attendance/numbers of 
prescription for those with medical/GP-Visit cards and predicted GP attendance/numbers of 
prescriptions for those without the cards). We then apply the €80 per night charge for a hospital night, 
the average €51 cost per GP visit22 and the average €46 per prescription23 in order to arrive at a total 
‘usage’ valuation for a Medical Card. The usage valuation of a GP-Visit card simply multiplies the 
number of GP visits by the average cost given that this card does not cover medicines or hospital stays. 
In estimating the value of medicines we impose a ceiling for those holding a Medical Card of €1605 
per annum. This accounts for the fact that even without a Medical Card, a family’s payments for 
prescription medicine would be capped under the Drug Payment Scheme. We also impose a limit of 
                                                          
22 Taken from the National Consumer Agency (2010) Doctor and Dentists Survey. May 2010. Dublin, National 
Consumer Agency.  
23 Taken from the HSE (2016) Primary Care Reimbursement Service Statistical Analysis of Claims and Payments 
2016. Dublin, HSE. The average cost of a prescription for those with a medical card was €53.38 with an average 
of 3 items per prescription. Deducting the prescription charge of €2.50-3 items gives an average prescription 
cost of €45.75. 
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€800 on the value of hospital nights representing the cap on annual hospital fees for non-Medical Card 
holders. 
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Appendix Two: Work Incentives Including Those without Children 
Figure 6: Replacement Rate Distribution; All Persons (with/without children)
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
Note that we exclude retirees and ill/disabled persons from the sample. 
 
Figure 7: Participation Tax Rate Distribution; All Persons (with/without children)
 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
Note that we exclude retirees and ill/disabled persons from the sample. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTRs) – All Workers (with/without 
children) 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model   
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Appendix Three: Work Incentives for Couples by 
Primary/Secondary Earner Status 
Figure 9: Replacement Rate Distribution; Couples with Children – Primary Earners only
 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
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Figure 10: Replacement Rate Distribution; Couples with Children – Secondary Earners only 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
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Figure 11: Participation Tax Rate Distribution; Couples with Children – Primary Earners 
only
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
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Figure 12: Participation Tax Rate Distribution; Couples with Children – Secondary Earners 
only 
Source: Own calculations using SWITCH, the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
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